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Abstract
We describe a novel approach to monitoring high level
behaviors using concepts from AI planning. Our goal
is to understand what a program is doing based on its
system call trace. This ability is particularly impor-
tant for detecting malware. We approach this problem
by building an abstract model of the operating system
using the STRIPS planning language, casting system
calls as planning operators. Given a system call trace,
we simulate the corresponding operators on our model
and by observing the properties of the state reached, we
learn about the nature of the original program and its
behavior. Thus, unlike most statistical detection meth-
ods that focus on syntactic features, our approach is se-
mantic in nature. Therefore, it is more robust against
obfuscation techniques used by malware that change
the outward appearance of the trace but not its effect.
We demonstrate the efficacy of our approach by evalu-
ating it on actual system call traces.
Introduction
Malware is a serious threat for computer and Internet
security for both individuals and entities. 430 million
new unique pieces of malware were detected by Syman-
tec in 2015, and 94.1 millions of malware variants during
only the month of February 2017. Not surprisingly, to
counter this threat, many techniques for malware de-
tection have been proposed. In this paper we are inter-
ested in the more general problem of understanding the
behaviors taking place in the system. Given this infor-
mation, one can determine whether they are malicious
or not, and if malicious, provide an informed response.
The standard approach to this problem is to use
pattern-recognition methods, which are syntactic in na-
ture. Roughly speaking, they view the input, whether
code or events, as a long string of symbols, and seek
properties of these strings that help classify them. To
fool these methods, malware attempts to obfuscate its
behavior by changing the sequence’s properties (You
and Yim 2010). Semantic methods, instead, try to
model the underlying system, seeking to understand the
input’s meaning, where in this paper, the input used is
Copyright c© 2018, Association for the Advancement of Ar-
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the system-call trace.1 Therefore, they have the poten-
tial to be more robust to obfuscation attempts.
The most extreme and most accurate semantic ap-
proach is a faithful simulation of every trace followed
by careful analysis of the resulting system state. This
is impractical: the analysis of the state of a computer
following each trace is a non-trivial time consuming task
that requires deducing high-level insights from the low
level state and can only be conducted by experts.
Instead, we propose a methodology that uses an ab-
stract system model based on AI-planning languages
and models. It requires a one-time, off-line effort by
an expert, and can be used automatically to analyze
each trace: An expert that understands the semantics
of system calls generates a planning operator for every
system call. Each operator describes how the state of
the system changes in response to the application of
some system call. Each operator is an abstraction that
attempts to capture the system call’s relevant effects.
The abstraction process also involves the generation of
a set of propositions describing the system state. Now,
given a system call trace, instead of simulating it on
the real system, we simulate the corresponding plan-
ning operators on the abstract state. The propositions
true in the resulting state give us the needed informa-
tion about what behaviors were carried out by this code.
This approach is fast and difficult to fool: obfuscation
techniques that do not impact the actual behavior will
not impact relevant aspects of the state.
In what follows we describe this methodology using
examples, and demonstrate its advantages by compar-
ing it to statistical methods on actual system calls re-
lated to a mail application.
Related work
(Forrest et al. 1996) is considered the seminal work
which pushed forward research on methods and rep-
resentations of operating system process monitoring
based on system calls. (Warrender, Forrest, and Pearl-
mutter 1999) provides an early comparison of machine
1A system call is a mechanism used by a program to
request from the operating system services it cannot perform
directly, such access to hardware, files, network or memory.
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learning methods for modeling process behavior. (Gao,
Reiter, and Song 2004) introduces the model of execu-
tion graph, and behavior similarity-measure based on
the execution graph. (Mutz et al. 2006) combines mul-
tiple models into an ensemble to improve anomaly de-
tection. (Xu and Shelton 2010) applies continuous time
Bayesian network (CTBN) to system call processes to
account for time-dependent features and address high
variability of system call streams over time. (Kim et
al. 2016) applies a deep LSTM-based architecture to
sequences of individual system calls, treating system
calls as a language model.
Initially, only system call indices were used as fea-
tures (Forrest et al. 1996; Warrender, Forrest, and
Pearlmutter 1999). (Liu et al. 2005) compares three
different representations of system calls: n-grams of
system call names, histograms of system call names,
and individual system calls with associated parameters.
(Poulose Jacob and Surekha 2007) proposes the use of
system call sequences of varying length as features. (Liu
et al. 2005; Tandon and Chan 2006) investigate extract-
ing features for machine learning from arguments of
system calls. (Wressnegger et al. 2013) studies novel
techniques of anomaly detection and classification us-
ing n-grams of system calls. (Canzanese, Mancoridis,
and Kam 2015) conducts a case study of n-gram based
feature selection for system-call based monitoring, and
analyses the influence of the size of the n-gram set and
the maximum n-gram length on detection accuracy.
Other work attempted to detect behaviors in a se-
mantic way, using abstract representations of behaviors
based on low level events and various techniques for
detection. They all carry the notion of state, keep-
ing track of effects of previous events. (Christodor-
escu et al. 2005) is the first to introduce semantics
to characterize malicious behaviors. It builds behavior
templates from binaries using formal semantics, which
is used through a semantics-aware algorithm for de-
tection. (Martignoni et al. 2008) builds multi-layered
behavior graphs from low level events used through
a behavior matcher. (Jacob, Debar, and Filiol 2009)
uses attribute grammars for abstraction and specifica-
tion, using parallel automata for parsing and detection.
(Tokhtabayev, Skormin, and Dolgikh 2010) specifies be-
haviors through UML activity diagrams from which one
generates colored Petri Nets for detection. (Beaucamps,
Gnaedig, and Marion 2012) uses first-order linear tem-
poral logic to specify behaviors and model checking
techniques for detection. (Ezzati-Jivan and Dagenais
2012) offers an advanced state-full approach where be-
haviors are specified as finite state machines. Our ap-
proach is more fine-grained and general. We model the
actual operators, not the target behaviors, although the
model is informed by the behaviors. We illustrate this
using the reverse shell example in the next section.
Behavior recognition is closely related to plan and
goal recognition (Sukthankar et al. 2014). Given a se-
quence of observed actions, the goal is to try to infer the
actor’s intentions. Typically, the output is a ranked list
of hypothesized goals. Most work assumes a library of
possible behavior instances, i.e., plans, an approach lim-
ited in its ability to go beyond known instances. Prob-
abilistic techniques, such as (Baker, Tenenbaum, and
Saxe 2005) use Bayesian methods to assess the proba-
bility of various goals based on the actions involved. An
influential recent approach is plan-recognition as plan-
ning (Ramı´rez and Geffner 2009), where the authors do
away with the assumption of an explicit plan library.
The plan library is replaced by a model of the domain
(which implicitly defines the set of possible plans), and
the goal is to compute a good plan that is closest to
the observed behavior. This line of work is appropriate
when the observations are a subset of the actual ac-
tions taken, or when we attempt to recognize the goal
before plan completion. We attempt to recognize mali-
cious behavior off-line given a complete trace, although
extensions for the online setting are natural.
Background
AI Planning
AI Planning is a decision making technique used to find
sequences of actions that can transform a system from
some initial state into a goal state. Formally, a classical
planning problem is a tuple: pi = 〈P,A, I,G〉. where: P
is a set of primitive propositions describing properties of
interest of the system; A is the action set. Each action
transforms the state of the system in some way; I is
the start state; and G is the goal condition — usually
a conjunction of primitive propositions. A state of the
world, s, assigns truth values to all p ∈ P . Recall that a
literal is simply a primitive proposition or its negation.
An action a ∈ A is a pair, {pre(a), effects(a)}, where
pre(a) is a conjunction of literals, and effects(a) is a set
of pairs (c, e) denoting conditional effects. We use a(s)
to denote the state that is obtained when a is executed
in state s. If s does not satisfy all literals in pre(a),
then a(s) is undefined. Otherwise, a(s) assigns to each
proposition p the same value as s, unless there exists a
pair (c, e) ∈ effects(a) such that s |= c and e assigns p a
different value than s. We assume that a is well defined,
that is, if (c, e) ∈ effects(a) then c∧pre(a) is consistent,
and that if both (c, e), (c′, e′) ∈ effects(a) and s |= c∧ c′
for some state s, then e ∧ e′ is consistent.
The classical planning problem is defined as fol-
lows: given a planning problem pi, find a sequence
of actions {a1, . . . , ak} (a.k.a. a plan) such that
ak(· · · (a1(I)) · · ·) |= G.
To illustrate this model, consider a simplified do-
main with three action types: socket, listen, and ac-
cept. These actions model the effect of system calls
that create a socket, listen for an incoming connection,
and accept a connection. For the sake of this example,
we ignore various parameters of these system calls, and
assume that system calls do not fail.
The set P contains: {(opened socket-descriptor),
(listening socket-descriptor), (connected socket-
descriptor)}, where socket-descriptor is a parameter
that we abbreviate as sd. The set of actions is:
• socket(returned-sd) with precondition: ¬(opened
returned-sd), and the effect: (opened returned-sd)2
• listen(sd) has no precondition and the conditional ef-
fect: (listening sd) when (opened sd) ∧¬(listening sd)
• accept(sd, returned-sd) has the preconditions: (lis-
tening sd) and the effects: (opened returned-sd) and
(connected returned-sd)
The plan socket(sd1), listen(sd1), accept(sd1, sd2) is
a legal plan. Initially, all propositions are false. Be-
cause (opened sd1) is false, we can apply socket(sd1).
Once applied, (opened sd1), the precondition of listen,
becomes true. This results in (listening sd1) becoming
true. Finally, accept needs a socket descriptor in the
state listening (sd1) and another having opened false
(sd2). It now sets sd2 to opened and connected. Given
the resulting state, we recognize that a host connected
itself to our local server.
On the other hand, the plan: socket(sd1), accept(sd1,
sd2) is invalid because the preconditions of accept are
not all sastified: (listening sd2) is not set to true.
Typically, planning models are used for generating
plans. Thus, in the above example, a planning algo-
rithm could find the (abstracted) sequence of system
calls required to achieve various goals. Our focus in
this paper is on the planning model itself — the propo-
sitions and the operators, as an abstraction of the op-
erating system. The acting agent is a running process,
the OS is the environment in which it is acting, and its
system-call trace defines the plan, via our mapping. To
determine what the process is doing, we simply observe
the abstract state of the OS. For the purpose of this pa-
per, we consider that the OS abstraction has a unique
running and single thread process.
Our approach
We propose to build an abstract system model and sim-
ulate an abstraction of the system call trace on it.
The manual part of our approach is the construc-
tion of the abstraction. We associate an action with
each system call, with preconditions (typically empty)
and effects (typically conditional). The set of propo-
sitions that we use to describe the system is informed
by the type of behaviors we want to capture. For ex-
ample, whether channels were opened, files accessed,
information transmitted over a channel, etc. An action
describes what new facts will become true following the
execution of the system call it models, possibly condi-
tional on other facts being true prior to its execution.
We illustrate this using the example of a remote shell:
a command line interface controlled by a remote host
often used by attackers to execute system commands.
We focus on the reverse shell, where a host connects it-
self to a remote server. Starting a reverse shell requires
2A more faithful model will use conditional effects in-
stead, and will also consider their return value.
a few steps: (1) Create a socket. (2) Independently con-
nect the socket to an endpoint and duplicate the socket
descriptor to the standard input and output (so that
the input and output streams go through the socket).
(3) Execute a shell.
We use system calls socket, connect, dup, fcntl, close
and execve that, respectively, create a socket, connect a
socket to a remote host, duplicate a socket, set proper-
ties to a socket, close a socket, and execute a program.
Propositions. The propositions are: (opened fd), (is-
socket fd), (equal-fds fd1 fd2), (close-on-exec fd), (con-
nected sd), (is-shell path), (remote-shell-started)
Initial state. The initial state initiates the resources
used by a process when it starts, and taints the ones
that have targeted properties:
• Propositions (opened fd0), (opened fd1), (opened fd2)
are set to true, as fd0/1/2 denote standard input/out-
put/error, respectively, and these files are open.
• Shell executable paths are tainted. We assume that
we know all of those presents on the operating sys-
tem. We handle two of them in this example: /bin/sh
and /bin/bash that we name respectively sh and bash.
Thus, (is-shell sh) and (is-shell bash) are set to true.
Actions. Planning operators are a simplified abstrac-
tion of the system calls. Since system calls called with
wrong arguments do not make programs crash, and
have no effect, the corresponding actions use condi-
tional effects only – i.e., they are always executable but
change the state only if their conditions are met.
• socket(returned-sd, cloexec) has the effects:
The flag FD CLOEXEC is represented by the
boolean cloexec.
– (opened returned-sd)∧(is-socket returned-sd) if
¬(opened returned-sd)
– (close-on-exec returned-sd) if ¬(opened returned-
sd)∧(= cloexec True)
• connect(sd) has the effects:
– (connected sd) if (opened sd)∧(is-socket
sd)∧¬(connected sd)
– ∀fd, (connected fd) if (equal-fds sd fd)∧(opened
sd)∧(is-socket sd)∧¬(connected sd)
• dup(sd, returned-sd) has the effects:
– (opened returned-sd)∧(equal-fds sd returned-
sd)∧(equal-fds returned-sd sd) if (opened
sd)∧¬(opened returned-sd)
– (is-socket returned-sd) if (is-socket sd)∧(opened
sd)∧¬(opened returned-sd)
– (connected returned-sd) if (connected sd)∧(opened
sd)∧¬(opened returned-sd)
– ∀fd, (equal-fds fd returned-sd)∧(equal-fds
returned-sd fd) if (equal-fds fd sd)∧¬(opened
returned-sd)
• fcntl(sd, command, returned-sd, cloexec) has the ef-
fects:
Figure 1: Valid Plans for the Reverse Shell domain
returned-sd is the argument of the command
F DUPFD and cloexec is the argument of the com-
mand F SETFD. F DUPFD CLOEXEC uses both.
The flag FD CLOEXEC is represented by the
boolean cloexec.
– same effects as dup(sd, returned-sd) if (= command
F DUPFD)∨(= command F DUPFD CLOEXEC)
– (close-on-exec sd) if [[(= command
F SETFD)∧(= cloexec True)]∨(= command
F DUPFD CLOEXEC)]∧(opened sd)∧¬(opened
returned-sd)
– ¬(close-on-exec sd) if (= command F SETFD)∧(=
cloexec False)∧(opened sd)∧¬(opened returned-sd)
• close(sd) has the effects:
– ¬(opened sd)∧¬(is-socket sd)∧ ¬(connected
sd)∧¬(close-on-exec sd)
– ∀fd, ¬(equal-fds sd fd)∧¬(equal-fds fd sd)
• execve(path) has the effect:
– (remote-shell-started) if (is-shell path) ∧∃fd, (con-
nected fd)∧¬(close-on-exec fd)∧[(= fd fd0)∨(equal-
fds fd fd0)]∧[(= fd fd1)∨(equal-fds fd fd1)]
Valid plans The five different valid plans shown in
Figure 1 show how diverse the plans are even for such
a simple example. Plan 1 is the standard sequence per-
formed to establish a reverse shell, which appears in
most shellcode databases. Plan 2 uses the fact that we
know that system call socket allocates the lowest file
descriptor available. Calling close(fd0) before socket
avoids the duplication of the socket on the file descrip-
tor 0. Plan 3 replaces one system call by an equivalent
one: dup is replaced by fcntl called with the command
F DUPFD. Plan 4 demonstrates that planning cap-
tures and updates correctly properties set by flags and
through different system calls. The flag FD CLOEXEC
is first set through system call socket, and reset later by
fcntl called on F SETFD. Plan 5 shows that planning is
able to follow complex flow of operation on file descrip-
tors. The key point is that, despite major differences in
appearance, which are likely to fool syntactic methods
(certainly, if some of the plans were not available previ-
ously), our semantic approach recognizes the behavior
they implement.
The main effort required by our approach is building
an appropriate model for each system call. This model
is informed by the basic set of low-level behaviors one
would like to model. Once completed, we can simulate
any sequence of system calls by applying them to an
initial state of the abstract system using any planning
simulator/validator. By examining the final state of the
system, we can recognize which behaviors took place.
Thus, the off-line modeling task is done once, and the
resulting model can be used repeatedly, automatically,
and very cheaply, to analyze programs.
The (manual) abstraction process is flexible. We can
use it to identify simple behaviors, such as create a
socket, connect to a remote host, read data from socket,
open file for writing, write into file, etc. And we can
also recognize complex behaviors by detecting combi-
nations of simple behaviors. For example, download-
ing a file requires reading data from a connected socket
and writing it to an opened file. Thus, once we have
the low-level behaviors, it is easy to capture the higher
level ones. We can do this by either modifying the ac-
tion model or by adding axioms, which are a method
of adding a simple form of inference to planning. With
such a layered approach, basic behaviors can be reused
to identify multiple high level behaviors.
As this model is an abstraction, some information is
lost in this model, and the method cannot be 100% cor-
rect and capture every nuance. Much can be captured
by building a more elaborate model, but some aspects,
such as accurate modeling of system resources, are not
likely to be practical.
Empirical evaluation
In the previous section we demonstrated the capabili-
ties of our approach to recognize behaviors on the re-
verse shell domain, where our planning model is able
to recognize the same behavior generated in different
ways. We now want to highlight our ability to recog-
nize complex, higher level behaviors that are built from
lower level behaviors, compared to statistical methods
that are quite popular in this area. To do this, we
consider the behavior of real processes involved in a
mail service. Given the system call trace logs of sev-
eral processes, we attempt to recognize which behavior
is realized by each of the processes, such as sending
an email via SMTP, collecting an email from a remote
server via IMAP, and so on. The code and data set
used for the empirical evaluation can be obtained from a
Git repository at https://github.com/alexEnsimag/
planning-for-syscall-monitoring.
Data Collection
We generate system call traces of processes running in
a mail service (Figure 2). The setup consists of two
hosts: the client and the server, and involves a num-
ber of processes, denoted in what follows in italic. The
hosts collect emails from an external server. In order
to provide sufficient volume and diversity of the data
fetchmail
procmail
postx
fetchmail
le system
CLIENT
dovecot
le system
SERVER
antivirus
postx
SMTP
IMAP
web-based 
mail service
Figure 2: A mail service setup for evaluation of planning
approach on mail delivery activities
processed, we opened a dedicated email account with
a web-based email service, and subscribed to multiple
promotion and notification mailing lists. On the client,
fetchmail is used to retrieve emails from a web-based
email provider via the IMAP protocol. Then, procmail
dispatches received emails, which are then sent by post-
fix to the server via SMTP protocol. The server’s post-
fix process receives the emails, passes them through the
amavis antivirus and stores in the local filesystem. The
dovecot process serves emails via the IMAP protocol.
The emails are retrieved by the client’s fetchmail, and
stored in the filesystem. We use Docker (Hykes 2013
2017) to run containers encapsulating the mail server
and mail client hosts, and sysdig (Draios, Inc. 2012
2016) to record the system calls.
We analyze system call traces of the following pro-
cesses: smtpd, fetchmail on the client, fetchmail on the
server, imap-login, all other processes.
These processes realize the following behaviors:
• receiving an email over the SMTP protocol;
• receiving an email over IMAP protocol;
• forwarding an email from the client to the server;
• IMAP connection setup and authentication;
• other behaviours not tracked by the system.
We use 440 samples for each process (including other).
Data is split into training and test sets as 66%/33%.
Statistical Classification. We compare our goal-
tracking approach to a baseline, commonly used sta-
tistical classification of processes based on system call
sequences. We train a statistical classifier (random for-
est) on the collected system call traces. This classifica-
tion approach is similar to approaches used in system
call monitoring literature (Canali et al. 2012), (Fir-
dausi et al. 2010). We use bi-gram vectorization of the
system call names. Our vocabulary contains 100 most
recurrent bi-grams in the corpus. Thus, each sample
is represented by a vector of 100 elements, where each
element in the vector represents one of the bi-grams in
the vocabulary and the values represent the number of
times a specific bi-gram appeared in that sample. For
example, if the first 4 elements in the vector correspond
to bi-grams (open, read), (read, write), (write,
read), and (write, close), a system call trace
open, read, write, read, write, close
will produce a bi-gram vector: 1, 2, 1, 1, . . .
We proceed with the empirical evaluation as follows:
1. We train a classifier that classifies each of the behav-
iors based on non-obfuscated system call sequences.
The classifier achieves 97% accuracy.
2. We create obfuscated samples in a way that ‘breaks’
the bi-grams by inserting a system call that has no ef-
fect on the process behavior (for example, sleep with
a sufficiently small argument) in between each couple
of system calls in the sequence. This method is called
adding semantic no-ops and is the focus of (Rosen-
berg and Gudes 2017). When testing the statistical
model on the obfuscated data we get 0% accuracy
(all samples in the test set are classified as ‘other’).
3. We retrain our model on both obfuscated and non-
obfuscated data. It now achieves ≈ 66% accuracy.
Planning-based Classification Information con-
tained in the system logs and manual inspection of sys-
tem call traces in the training set are used to specify
the planning domain and the goal for each of the be-
haviors. Then, the VAL plan validation system (Long
2014) is used to classify system call traces in the test
set. The planning-based classifier based on the domain
built for the original, non-obfuscated system call logs is
applied to both non-obfuscated and obfuscated system
call traces. In both cases, the planning based classifier
reaches over 98% accuracy. Manual inspection of the
misclassified samples suggests that the samples corre-
spond to failed communication between components of
the mail service.
Random forest Planning-based
Original 97% 98%
Obfuscated 0% 98%
Re-trained 66% 98%
Table 1: Classification accuracy on real system logs
Table 1 summarizes the results. Our goal-tracking
approach successfully classifies processes. Statistical
methods are able to distinguish between different pro-
cesses, but are prone to obfuscation. The obfuscation
technique we used in this case study is particularly chal-
lenging for statistical classification, and with other ob-
fuscation techniques the difference in accuracy might
not be as sharp. However, the planning-based approach
is inherently more robust in the face of obfuscation, as
it captures semantic behavior, which must remain in-
tact, rather than just statistical manifestations, which
can be easily altered.
Discussion and future work
We presented an approach for monitoring computer
programs using an abstract model of the system state
and the basic ”actions” that operate on this state —
system calls, in our case. The method is semantic in na-
ture, and hence not prone to the weaknesses of syntac-
tic methods that consider the command sequences form
rather than their meaning. Unlike statistical methods
that, in principle, can be fully automated, our approach
has a non-trivial, one-time manual modeling step. But
once the model is constructed, it can be used automat-
ically and with little cost.
We demonstrated the effectiveness of our method by
first showing how we capture a simple low level be-
havior that has diverse implementations using a sim-
ple model. Syntactically, each implementation is quite
different, yet the common semantics can be captured
by modeling just a few system calls. Then, we showed
how we detect more complex, higher level behavior with
almost perfect accuracy, without being affected by ob-
fuscation techniques that easily fool state-of-the-art sta-
tistical methods. The approach used here can be used
for other applications beyond system-call logs, such as
analysis of transactions, HTTP logs, and more. More-
over, we believe that it could complement statistical
methods by allowing us to run statistical analysis on the
higher level features generated by our abstract state.
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